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LEGAL TENDER NOTES BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT.

THE recent discussion of the question of the validity of the.
Act of Congress creating the legal tender notes, before the Supreme Court of the United States, and the manner in which the
question is viewed by the public in geneial, are certainly calculated
to create, or perhaps we might more properly say to confirm, distrust in general public opinion, as. an index or guide to truth.
When the law was first passed it was regarded as *evidence of disloyalty for any one to impugn the validity of that act. The class
of men, considerably numerous, indeed, and highly respectable in
point of character, learning, and ability, who did openly denounce
the act as an unworthy debasement, or attempted debasement of
the public money of the nation, was encountered and assailed
from every portion of the country as disloyal and unpatriotic;
and certain epithets which were regarded as derogatory, and specially efficient in producing opprobrium and discredit, were freely
heaped upon them, without measure or stint. At the present time,
however, all this seems to be changed. Every one seems to feel
at liberty to discuss the question of the validity of the law with
the utmost freedom. But what is most remarkable in this discussion is, that while the best lawyers and the most cautious and conservative men in the country now approach the question with obvious diffidence and distrust in their own power to comprehend all
its bearings, or to give it a satisfactory determination, the poliVOL. XVII.-13
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ticians, and letter writers, and others of the class who spend much
of their time, as the Athenians did in the days of St. Paul, in
hearing or telling some new thing, and who are supposed to reflect
pretty accurately the general, superficial political public sentiment
of the country, for the day, or the hour, exhibit a most amazing
amount of flippancy and readiness to relieve all the doubts and
difficulties of their hearers and readers by their own single and
simple ipse dixit. And so common is it, in and about the Capitol,
and in the leading city journals, at the great commercial centres
of the nation, to hear and read the unqualified opinion and declaration, that the court will declare the law invalid with all but unanimity, that one is led to seek the explanation of this surprising
garrulity against the law in the very quarters where but lately
was found such inquisitorial intolerance of all such opinion, in
some source of light and intelligence quite beyond any developments disclosed in the argument. It almost seems as if the authors
of the act would now be glad to escape responsibility by invoking
the aid of the court in declaring it void. But the court will do
no such thing, for any such reason.
We had the agreeable opportunity of listening to the argument
before the court through most of the sessions for three successive
days, and it was certainly such an intellectual banquet as is very
rarely exhibited in any forensic encounter. We do not care to
venture upon any specific estimatp of the particular excellencies
of the successive advocates, where all were confessedly so able and
so eloquent. We had listened to all the advocates, on other occasions, with the except.ion of Mr. Potter, of New York. The opening argument in favour of the validity of the law was made by
Judge Curtis, in his clearest, purest, happiest vein, as nearly perfect, both in matter and manner, as it is possible for us to conceive
a law argument to be. Mr. Townsend, of New York, and Mr.
Potter occupied parts of two days in reply, placing the main force
of the argument on the ground of the impolicy and injustice of
the law, and upon the early history of the Government and the
Constitution, as showing both the improbability that the Constitution was intended to receive any such construction, and, as far
as practicable, the fact that such was not the purpose of its framers, or of those who 'adopted it. These gentlemen commanded a
good degree of attention, and made themselves, on the whole, very
interesting.
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The Attorney-General, Mr. Evarts, closed the argument with
his usual copiousness of learning and fulness of illustration.
The only possible exception one can make to his manner of
arguing causes in bane is, that he is, if possible, too deliberate,
causing the attention of the court, after listening a considerable
time, to rather flag, and lose something of that keen edge which
it is always desirable to maintain throughout, if possible. A certain degree of deliberation and quiet self-possession adds very
greatly to the force of a mere dry legal argument before a bench
of judges, especially where, as in the present case, they are considerably numerous. And we know that Daniel Webster sometimes adopted this peculiar mode of argument with great effect in
addressing courts; and juries possibly sometimes, but not by any
means as a general rule. And he could do some things, sometimes, which it would be scarcely safe for any other maVl to attempt.
As his favorite brother, Ezekiel, once said of him;" Brother Daniel
could puzzle" [or even overwhelm] "1a great many men that knew
more than he did." No American, probably, and no Englishman,
perhaps, ever possessed the power of manner which Daniel Webster seemed unconsciously to fall, or be driven, into. What seemed
in him the inspiration of the moment, or the result of the secret
and hidden springs of the cause, might not always appear so in
others, at least on occasions of no special interest.
But bating this single and unimportant drawback in the Attorney-General's mode of speaking (which we are specially desirous
of seeing improved to the extent of the Latin maxim, festina
lente, on account of our great admiration of the man), it must be
admitted that he presents one of the best models of forensic eloquence at present to be found in this or perhaps any other country. Mr. Evarts' dry law arguments, while abQunding in all the
learning and logic which it is desirable to find there, abound also
with the richest and choicest illustrations which it is possible to
conceive, or which the purest and most chastened rhetorician
could desire. And this alone makes it necessary to occupy more
time than would otherwise be required, and thus imposes a somewhat greater strain upon the powers of the orator. The argument of Judge Curtis fell far within the limits of one hour, and
it commanded the most undivided and unflagging attention to the
last moment; and as a presentation of the legal argument, and
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it aspired to nothing else, it was certainly of a most uncommon
and unrivalled character.
But the general style of argument in this court is losing much
of that conversational air which gave it such a charm thirty years
ago, and which still prevails, to a great extent, in Westminster
Hall. The present style of forensic debate there is more like that
of Pinkney, and Emmett, and Lowndes, than the school that followed these great masters of forensic eloquence, which was far less
ornate and discursive. Each has its advantages and its followers.
But the present style of forensic debate in America is rather
French than English, and is based, perhaps, somewhat upon Rufus
Choate's theory, that if you would move the court and jury, you
must first electrify the bystanders, and the audience generally.
But we are very far from any assurance that the ablest, and
purest, and most learned courts, and the judges of this court
possess all these'qualities in an eminent degree, are sure to be
most effectually convinced, upon a great constitutional question,
by merely dry legal views. There was soniiething so stirring in
the many eloquent illustrations and appeals of the Attorney-General, that we could not but feel that very likely they would effect a
lodgment in the sternest legal minds, where no force of pure cold
logic could reach. We believe the ablest, and -most experienced,
and learned judges are more frequently induced to reconsider a
over-established opinion, upon the force of a pertinent illustration,
or an argument ab inconvenienti, or the reductio ad absurdum, than
by any amount of inere deductive reasoning. But it is fair to say
that, taking the pure legal view of Mr. Curtis, and the mixed
legal and practical view of the Attorney-General, there was
nothing more to be desired on that side.
The argument upon the other side was considerably weakened
in its force, upon the general question of the validity of the legal
tender clause in the act,,by the fact that the validity of gold contracts, under the law, was also involved in the cases, and this of
course caused considerable diversion and consequent loss of force
upon the main issue. One of the speakers, too,-whose argument was in the main very able and happy,-we are bound to say
fell into the common fault of diffuse and ready speakers generally,
of loading his argument with an infinite number of illustrations,
drawn from every source of supposed analogy, many of which
were far more doubtful than the main proposition, thus dividing
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attention of the court and dissipating the intrinsic force of his argument. Mr. Townsend, whose case was that of a gold contract, in
terms, made a very close and learned argument, which we should
be surprised to have overruled by the court, even if they maintain
the entire validity of the act. Having spoken so much at length
upon the argument in these cases, we shall be able to say less in
regard to the questions involved than we had desired, or intended.
But we shall present a brief resumg of the points, not much
relied upon in the argument before the court, but which appear
to us worthy of consideration.
The argument against the validity of the act seems to be placed
largely upon the injustice and severity of its operation upon past
transactions. This argument, as it seems to us, is completely
answered by the consideration that the validity of an act of legislation does not, in any sense, depend upon its innate wisdom or
justice. Where the power of legislation exists, it is equally
operative, whether its exercise be wise or unwise, just or unjust.
And the same injustice is confessedly within the power of Congress, in regard to the currency, by debasement of the metallic
coinage as by issuing bills of credit. The Acts of Congress have
more than once lowered the standard of the established coinage,
and -thus lessened the amount of standard gold or silver which
subsisting contracts would require for their performance. And
if this can be done in a small degree, it can equally be done to
any extent which the government shall deem expedient, and thus
effect the same depreciation complained of by making legal tender
notes, so that this argument is thus effectually answered. It is
a power which the National Legislature always possesses, and may
exercise at will.
Again, much stress is often placed upon the historical fact that
it was proposed in the convention framing the Constitution to give
the express power to the National Government to issue bills
of credit, and that this was not accepted, or, as it is called,
was rejected. Now this is not by any means the same thing as
if the power to make the Constitution had resided in the convention. It is not the same as if the proposition to emit bills of
credit had been submitted to the people and rejected. The most
that can fairly be argued from this fact is, that the convention
could not agree to submit to the people any express provision to
enable the National Government to issue bills of credit. If this
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had been done, it must have been accepted in that form, or the
whole Constitution would have been rejected. This might have
been the prevailing reason which induced the convention not to
embrace that specific provision in the frame of government submitted. It merely shows then, that, for some reason, the convention could not agree to submit that express provision.
But it by no means leaves the Constitution, as adopted, subject
to any implications against the provision being virtually implied
in what was sub~nitted and adopted, because this express provision
was not embraced in it. The people had no knowledge of the
discussions of the convention, or of the propositions discussed by
it and not embodie l in the Constitution, but acted upon the document as presented to them; and it is therefore fairly entitled to
receive its construction upon what appears in it, without reference
to any discussions or propositions before the convention, and which
did not result in any affirmative action. It is much like the case
of a contract, since the passing of the Legal Tender Act, in which
the parties, in their preliminary action, had attempted to define
the currency, either gold or greenback, in which it should be payable, but could not agree, and therefore left it to legal implication.
There would surely be no ground of argument, in such a case,
that the parties had virtually fixed the currency in which payment should be made, or that because the parties failed to agree
either upon gold or currency, both must be excluded. No principle of legal construction is more familiar, than that none of the
preliminary negotiations can be received or considered in fixing
the construction of the- contract. And the same is true in regard
to any written instrument, whether a contract; a testament, or a
constitution. Each must speak by its own words, construed with
reference to its subject-matter and the purpose of its creation.
If then the United States Constitution, like ordinary written
instruments, is entitled to be construed by its language, with
reference to those allowable aids to which resort is always made
in such cases, we shall find less embarrassment in reaching a
satisfactory conclusion than if we were compelled to regard the
views of the framers or of the people, then or now, or any'other
outside influences, in the matter. No doubt tradition, or contemporary history, may, in many instances, afford great aid in learning the import of terms, or the general purpose and intent of an
apt or instrument, or contract.
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In that view the known and declared facts recited in the preamble of the Constitution, wherein the transaction is declared to
be the work or act of the people of the whole United States, is
a very significant intimation that the purpose was to create a
national sovereignty, and not a mere confederation among the
states. The other portions of the preamble look in the same
direction. "To form a more perfect union, establish justice,
insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence,
promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty
to ourselves and our posterity," are all objects not to be expected
from any thing less than the establishment of a national and consolidated sovereignty.
Then the general frame of the instrument shows that the new
government was expected to embrace all the important, certainly
all the indispensable, powers and functions of national sovereignty,
and that it was to be automatic, possessing all the functions and
resources of sovereign states, viz., executive, legislative, and judicial.
As showing too the paramount and supreme power of the
newly-created national government, the national judiciary is given
the supreme function of defining and measuring all the national
powers, and at the same time of defining and measuring the
powers reserved to the several states under the National Constitution, by allowing writs of error to the highest.judicial tribunal
in the state from the Supreme Court of the nation in all matters
affecting any power or function derived from or under any Act
of Congress or the National Constitution, or where it was claimed
that any conflict had arisen in regird to the validity of any state
law by reason of its conflict with the powers and functions of the
national government under its Constitution, and the decisions
of the state court had been adverse to the national claim of authority.
-Under such a distribution of the powers of sovereignty, it would
be natural to find that the power of making money and declaring
the value of the same should be reposed in the national government, as a clearly national function. This we do find to be the
fact, either fully or subject to limitations. There can be no doubt
that before creating the national sovereignty the general and unlimited power of making money, in all modes known to the law
of free states, did exist in the fullest possible form in each of the
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states. And although the history of free states shows, that for
commercial purposes a circulating medium of the precious metals
is regarded as the most desirable, and the only desirable one,
yet it is certain this has never been regarded as the exclusive currency of even commercial states. Almost all the European states
have, in emergencies of great pressure, during war or in other
great commercial crises, resorted to the issue of national bills of
credit, by declaring them part of the money or circulating medium
of the country. This question was incidentally involved in a
recent case in the English courts of equity, where the Emperor
of Austria sought to enjoin Louis Kossuth and one Day, the
manufacturers, from preparing and issuing bills of credit in the
name of the kingdom, or the king, of Hungary. No question
seems there seriously to have been made by counsel or entertained
by the court but that such bills, when lawfully issued, would constitute a portion of the lawful money of the empire: Emperor of
Austria v. Kossuth et al., 7 Jur. N. S. 483, before V. C. STUART;
S. c. before Court of Ch. Appeal, Id. 639; 2 Story Eq. Ju. § 951 e.
It is declared in Craig v. &Sateof 2issouri,4 Pet. 410, and is
a fact in history familiarly known, that the states, before the
adoption of the Constitution, had repeatedly exercised the power
of issuing bills of credit and declaring them lawful tender for
private debts, that is, making them lawful money. The confederacy, before the adoption of the Constitution, possessed no
power over the subject of lawful tender, and were compelled to,
as they repeatedly did, appeal to the states to declare the national
bills of credit lawful tender.
This was one of the defects 4 the national authority, which it
was the purpose of the Constitution to remedy. This was done
by prohibiting the states from coining money or issuing bills of
credit, or making any thing but gold and silver a tender for private debts. This in effect took from the states all power over the
subjects, both of making money and declaring legal tender. This
seems to be so regarded by Ch. J. MARSHALL, in Craigv. Missouri,
supra, where.he shows very clearly that both these functions are
prohibited to the states. This must be so if the states could
neither coin money or issue bills of credit, since this covers the
whole subject of tender laws. And accordingly we find that Congress has always controlled the subject of tender since the adoption of the Constitution, and the states have never attempted to
interfere. This, o~f itself, is such a practical construction of the
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Constitution as must, on every sound principle, be regarded as
settling the respective powers of the nation and the states over
the subject of tender laws.
We think it fair too to say, that the entire power of making
money is, by the Constitution, given to Congress. We have seen
that it existed before the formation of the national government
in all the states, and that it is now probihited to them all. It must therefore exist in Congress, or not at all. If it had been
the purpose of the Constitution to prohibit the power of issuing
bills of credit and making them lawful tender, equally to the
national government as to the states, it is impossible to conjecture
why it should not have been done in the same or similar terms.
The fact that both are distinctly and expressly prohibited to the
states, and that not one word is said in regard to their being exercised by the nation, is certainly a very significant intimation that
it was not deemed proper to -extend the prohibition beyond the
states, but to leave its exercise by the nation to the necessities
and emergencies of after times, to be exercised or not according
to future exigencies, the same as it exists in all free and sovereign
states.
This is very obviously to be inferred from the consideration
that the whole subject of issuing bills of credit and making them
lawful ihoney was familiar to the delegates, in the then recent
experience of the times, and especially must it have been present
to their minds in making such express provisions in regard to its
exercise by the states. It could not, therefore, have been supposed the national government would never have occasion to exercise such a power, since that had. very recently been done by a
national government possessing far less automatic power than the
one then about to be created, upon the basis of paramount
national sovereignty. Nor is it fair to conclude that it was then
supposed there could never arise an emergency where it might be
necessary to declare these bills of credit lawful tender or lawful
money; since the nation had just had experience of that same
necessity and had appealed to the states for the exercise of that
same power, which they were now in express terms prohibiting
them from exercising in future. And if it had been the purpose to extinguish and utterly abolish this power everywhere, we
can conjecture no good reason why that should not have been
done in terms, either by prohibiting all bills of credit as lawful
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money, or else declaring, as in regard to the states, that Congress
or the nation should never make anything but gold and silver a
lawful tender for private debts. We must surely conclude either
that it was intended to abolish this known and important function
of government or else leave its exercise to the nation.
Whether, therefore, we look for this power in the clause "To
borrow money on the credit of the United States," or that "To
raise and support armies," which is evidently but a subdivision
of the former,.or whether we find it embraced under the liberal
and only sensible construction of the power to "1coin money,
regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin," is not very material. It must be obvious to all that an instrument creating a
paramount national sovereignty, and prohibiting the exercise of all
sovereign national functions, such as making money, by the states,
should- not, except upon strict necessity, resulting from the terms
used, be so construed as to destroy or essentially abridge so important and indispensable a national function as the creation of
paper currency upon great ahd pressing emergencies; a function
exercised by all commercial states in those trying exigencies
which, as in all past history, always have occurred, so in all future
time must be expected to occur.
We only desire further to say that it seems to us that the courts
and the profession have manifested more refinement than wisdom
in giving the clause in the Constitution, "to coin money," such a
precise and literal interpretation as to exclude all paper money
under all circumstances. In its most literal sense it will extend
to all kinds of metal, to iron and tin, as well as gold and silver,
and perhaps also to every substance capable of receiving and
retaining an impression, for coining in its most literal import
means nothing but stamping with a device. Any material, therefore, which can be stamped may be coined. And in that sense
any impressible material, even paper, is susceptible of literal
coinage. But the true construction unquestionably is, that the
more common mode of creating money is here, by a figure of
speech, put for the whole, and that " coining" money means
nothing more than making money. For unless we do adopt this
construction, there is no power by which money of gold and silver
can be made in any other mode except coinage. It could not be
done by weight, in the form of bars or bullion, or by stamping
pieces of gold or silver, -short of coinage, or by any other known or
newly-discovered device. Such a narrow and literal construction
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of language would never be adopted in regard to the interpretation of other written instruments. The endorsement of notes and
bills, which literally imports an assignment upon the back of the
instrument, may just as well be upon the face of the instrument,
as has been often decided. So also a contract for the nanufacture of cloth, or machinery, or any other thing, where it was susceptible of being done, either by hand, as the word literally
imports, or by machinery, would never be received in a strict
literal sense. All that is implied is, that it shall be so made as to
answer the ordinary purposes and objects of such fabrics in the
market. These illustrations might be carried to any extent.
Any court which should assume to give language any such literal
construction, in regard to an incidental and collateral matter, only
implied from the etymology of the terms used upon any other
subject, would shock the common instincts and common sense of
mankind. And why that strict and extremely literal construction
of this clause of the Constitution should be so strenuously insisted
upon on this subject, any more than upon other portions of the
instrument, is not easily explainable. If one of the most accurate of English writers could speak of "coining blood for
drachmas," why may not a nation coin money in all the modes
known at the time the power is created, and thus stamp its own
paper with the quality of lawful money? Few men will argue
that the government might not stamp the quality'of money upon
gold and silver without literally coining it, and if so, why may it
not effect the same thing with its own paper, as no limitation is
found, surely, in regard to the material of which money shall be
made by the national authority? It may be of any metal or
other material susceptible of coinage. The same thing may be
effected by stamping such material. Is paper, therefore, certainly
excluded? Can that be fairly said when it was one of the known
modes of making money at the time, and present to the minas of
the framers? If money may be coined out of paper, it is surely
none the worse for containing the promise of the government.
It may undoubtedly be fairly argued that this power of emitting
bills of credit and stamping them with the qualities of lawful money,
was not intended to be given as the ordinary mode of making
money. It was not expected the nation woulj.1 attempt to do,
under ordinary circumstances, what all nations regarded as
destructive policy, except in times of war or extreme emergencies.
The same is true of borrowing money, which is one of the express
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powers granted in terms most unquestionable. No nation can
borrow money for its ordinary current expenses and not come to
ruin and bankruptcy, any more than an individual could do the
same and not lose credit. Current expenses must be met by current income or all credit and character is lost, both personal and
national.
To argue that no power to emit bills of credit and stamp them
as lawful money was intended to be given to the nation, but that
still this may be done in all great emergencies, when it is impracticable to maintain the national life in any other way, seems to us
very nearly equivalent to saying that the power is not given at all
as an ordinary function of government; but it may be resorted
to, by way of spasmodic convulsion, in the last throes of existence! This seems to be an admission that it is not given but may
be assumed in articulo mortis, the same as the people may resort
to the inherent right of revolution when the oppressions of the
existing government become intolerable ! This is a species of legal
construction not judicial in its character as it seems to us. We
would sooner presume it, as a necessary incident of national
sovereignty.
Such an argument seems to us rather political than legal; a
function of the legislative or executive authority, rather than of
the judiciary. If the power to emit bills of credit and stamp
them as money is not given in the function of borrowing money
and coining money, it seems to me, with submission, that it is not
given at all. But it seems very clear to us that these express
powers of borrowing money and making money must be supposed
to have been given to be exercised, not only in all the then
known and usual modes of doing those things, which will cover
the present issue of treasury notes, but also in all future modes
and emergencies which might be desirable as they should arise.
This is the only mode of construing the Constitution which will
make it answer the purpose of its adoption. Upon any other
mode of construction a written constitution must become an intolerable hamper and impediment to the just development and growth
of the national life, which should surely be avoided if the courts
possess the power of. rising to the demands of the exigencies of
advancing time, which is one of the indispensable functions of
judicial construction, and which can alone render written laws
endurable.
I.F.R.
WASHINGTON, December 17th 1868.

